The Athenian Empire: The
Problem. In the 50 years after 480 Athens became the dominant (tho hardly the
sole) power in the Aegean. How did she acquire this status? and how did the
other states respond? Ancient historians describe Athenian domination as as "empire",
and suggest that she was a "tyrant" state.
But what do these words mean?
- Imperialism:
- Classical realism: a nation's interests are determined by its power (material resources) relative to other nations; nations thus expand when the can and do so in a rational manner
- Defensive realism: states seek security rather than influence; hence they expand their interests / control when threatened.
- Tyranny:
- when the regime rules its own people or others solely or mostly in its own interest.
- The tyrant nominally operates within a set of rules (laws), but subverts those rules and imposes its will by intimidation.
What is the case for both in respect to Athens? What does the evidence suggest? Classical realism? Defensive realism?
Some vocabulary:
- "League" = "koinon"
or what is "in common";
- "hegemon" = the leader of a league, but the autonomy and freedom of the members respected.
- "arché" = empire. The Athenians were accused of converting a koinon (with its set of rules) into
an "arché" (so Thucydides reports) and of becoming a "tyrant-state" (tyrannos polis, ACG 138) .
The chronology of the "inter-war" period
It is important to bear in mind that the victory in the war against Persia and the Athenian tendency to attribute her own success (at Salamis) in that struggle to the democratic reforms and greater inclusion was invigorating both politically and intellectually. Athens was the most dynamic state in the Greek world because she had pushed democracy (inclusion) the furthest. The dynamism certainly contributed to political dominance. Moreover, Athens was also much more oriented to commerce and manufacturing than toward agriculture; she was relatively more capitalistic in her orientation (Aristeides advised the Athenians to lay claim to the hegmonia (that is the leadership of a league) and leaving their fields to live in the town; for there would be livelihood for all..ACG 137)
Bourgeois and Marxist historians have long debated whether the imperialism is an inevitable consequence of capitalist democracies.
The Strategic Dilemma facing...
- The Persians
- The Athenians
- The Spartans
- The Greek cities along the Aegean
- Introduction: This period
is usually divided into three periods based on the changes in the structure
of the Athenian / Delian League.
- 478-461: characterized
by the establishment of the League (by 'consent' and of Athenian equality with Sparta
(ACG 129-130). Persia checked.
- 460-448: the transition
from a consensual confederacy to "empire" and the introduction of the "radical
democracy" (ACH 132a; 134-6). Formally the transition is marked by the decision to move the treasury of the League to Athens (from Delos).
- 448-432: formal
peace with Persia and Sparta, but both sides (Athens and Sparta) prepare
for war. Though official justification for the league is apparently gone,
Athens continues to exploit it to support programs at home.
- The general strategy
of this period was to secure the Aegean from the Persians. To do so meant
a naval policy, for only through a fleet could Xerxes really threaten
Greece. After the capture of the Hellespont (479), the Spartans sail for
home, the Athenians and Ionians remain and besiege Sestos. This was an
independent action and where Thucydides begins his history.
- Athens had,
till Sestos, accepted the leadership of Sparta. Now she is motivated
to pursue an in dependant policy by ties of sentiment, of the necessity
to strengthen her naval and commercial ties and by the confidence
of her citizens.
- The re-construction
of her walls and their extension to the port of the Peiraeus gave
the Athenians the base they needed on the mainland.
- Forces at Work
... The strategic dilemma in more detail
- At Sparta
- Tension within
the governing ranks as corruption disturbs the equilibrium (ACG 130); outside
influences make helots restless and lead to an outright revolt that
was finally suppressed in 460. Thereafter, Sparta pursues a cautious
foreign policy.
- The allies of
Sparta: concerned about her apparent inability to deal effectively
with Athenian expansion. Only in did 430s did the problems
at Corcyra and at Potidaea and then the Megarian Decree induce the
allies to force Sparta to declare war or lose her allies.
- At Athens (ACG
130) .
- In general
- At the end of
the Persian Wars, Athens had the means (her fleet) and the reasons
(traditional and commercial ties with Ionia) to pursue an independent
foreign policy in those areas where Sparta had neither the will nor
the means.
- The justification
for the league was first and foremost to liberate and to defend the
Greek states, but also to ensure peace and to secure trade in the
Aegean. The maritime Greek states stood to benefit. Piracy, an endemic problem without a dominant naval force, was suppressed.
- The structure of the league: analogous to Peloponnesian League (two bodies, the Athenian assembly and the 'allies', the latter meeting on the sacred island of Delos, hence called the 'Delian League'. Each of the allies made a contribution (phoros) in ships, money or some combination based on an assessment.
- Until 448, she
pursues an active anti-Persian policy. Thereafter, she "exploits"
her allies; i.e., she moves the treasury to Athens for the sake of "security", and uses the income of the league to support internal
programs (ACH138) and to expand the democracy.
- Was Athens an Empire? Does she rule unwilling states by force and intimidation?
- Her allies,
after 25 years of satisfaction with her leadership, become restless
and disaffected as their autonomy is gradually, but systematically,
lost (as they convert their phoros to money. Note the revolts indicated on this map by the underlined name. Implications of revolts?" are we dealing with willing states?
- (ACH 136) "there were various reasons for the revolts, but the most important were failure to provide phoros or ships...for the Athenians made no allowances in their demands and were severe in applying pressure; moreover in doing so the allies / subjects were ...rendering themselves unprepared and incompetent in war when they revolted" ACH 130) when they chose to provide tax instead of service
- "After the Athenians had gained their empire, they treated their allies dictatorially, except for Chios, Lesbos and Samos [only these still provided ships]. These they regarded as guardians of the empire, allowing them to keep their own constitution and rule over any subjects they happened to have."
(Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 24). The implication here is that Athens too intervened in the constitutional order of her subjects.
- The clearest sign of autonomy and freedom for Greek state was to strike its own coinage, but "If anyone in the cities [of the Delian League] strikes silver coins and does not use the currency, weights and measures of the Athenians, but foreign currency, weights and measures ... [the Athenians will] exact penal retribution"
(Klearkhos? Decree, ESHAG 101 of about 448??). Note: the treasury of the League moved from Delos to Athens in about 450 BC.
- The relationship
between league and domestic affairs at Athens...The test here is whether Athens was a tyrant, using the resources of their subjects for their own purposes.
- Thucydides records that Athens was labeled by others as a tyrannos polis, ACG 138).
- The misthos = state salaries: "Kimon was using [his wealth] to win over the poor...providing dinner every day to any needy Athenian...clothing...it was because Perikles found himself outdone in these demagogic techniques that he turned to the distribution of public funds...[and] bribed the multitude with theater tickets and salaries [misthos] ACG 141. More than 20,000 men were supported from the tribute and the taxes of the allies. ACG 137
- for the building program: Greece was seen suffering a grievous insult to be ruled by an open tyranny as it watched the Athenians gilding their polis with monies that it (the allies) had been compelled to contribute for war... ACG 138.
- distribution of booty: ACG 131 (when the spoils that had been captured had been sold, the demos had a plentiful supply of money for all its needs); also ACG 140; 142
- Athens' ability
to pursue this policy successfully depended not only on her allies,
but also on the continuation and development of her democracy (see
below).
- That her policy
was, to varying degrees anti-Spartan, was based on several considerations:
- mutual suspicion
arising out of distinctly antithetical political systems. Careful: both agreed that those who fight should vote, the questions was how inclusive the system should be. Athens was considered to be 'radically' different.
- a justifiable
belief that Sparta would not tolerate a rival of equal power for long,
- it is not clear
what the ultimate goal of the Athenians was; nonetheless, she recognized that
the expansion of her power and domination would be opposed.
- In order for Athens'
position to be secured and her ambitions realized, Athens had to
expand her democracy further. If the institutions (i.e., the participation
in those institutions, a key factor in any city-state, ACG
123-4; 126; 137-40) were to be expanded, then
means had to be found to subsidize the participation of the lower classes.
Funds for this purpose were obtained from the allied contributions (i.e.,
she had to expand the number of citizens and to find ways to support their
participation as 'fighters/voters'). Participation, 'citizenship', then came to be more privileged (ACH
128; 137; 141; cf. ESHAG
64) and as such was also now more restricted.
- Justification of
the Athenian position: arguments could be produced on both sides of this
important issue.
- Athens did
offend nomos by her "taxation without representation", but
she also provided security, a service.
- It was both 'expedient' and 'rational' to adopt such a policy (we
will cover this issue in another lecture).
- A footnote to
history: Athens lost the war and lost her empire, nonetheless, she
retained and continued to develop the radical democracy out of her
own commercial resources. Implications??
- Social and military
resources of Athens --Grew substantially with empire. General Population 400,000;
186,000 Athenian citizens. The navy and democracy related
- Athenian society:
186,000 Athenian citizens of which ca 4,000 in upper two classes, 100,000
in middle and 65,000 thetes. Also: 30,000 resident aliens and 200,000
slaves (a major problem, but not racial or agrarian; generally humane, slaves
competed with free labor for wage, manumission easily obtained ESHAG
Doc 73).
- Military resources
- hoplites (heavy
and light): 23,000
- cavalry &
trierachs: 1,400
- thetes: 18,000 = rowers
- fleet: standing
fleet of 100 ships = 12-20,000 men
- Public service.
Of 40,000 adult males and in any one year, 500 would serve as members
of boulé, 6000 jurymen, 1400 magistrates at home or abroad = 7900
or 25% of population. In war, up to 20,000 served in fleet.
- The empire made
Athens the only state with a substantial cash income (about 600 T = approx $300 million). Latter
essential for a fleet, one third of ships had to be replaced every year.
Rest used to pay for public service. Still, Athens had built up a substantial
reserve (8000 T = $2,800,000,000,000) originally on Delos, later in temple of Athena in Athens
(Tribute Lists). 1 T = 25 Kg (60 lbs.) of Ag; some costs: 3 T for one
trireme; construction of Propylaea and Parthenon 2000 T; siege at Potidaea
ca 6000T. N.B.: 1T=6000 work-days or 23 years or labor.
Classroom exercise We will do this on Thursday.
- What does it mean to say that Athens became a tyrant state?
- What is the evidence for this proposition?
- Why were the allies of Athens unable to prevent the transformation from league to empire?