The focus of the lecture is on two overlapping themes. The first, and fairly straightforward, is the first phase of the Peloponnesian War; the second is the historiography of Thuycides. I have to admit, I am not sure whether to give you the theory or the events first; one needs the former to understand the latter, but the latter makes no sense without the former.

Note that many historians have thought that the Peloponnesian War is important because Thucydides wrote of it so well.

The division of Greece during the war.

The political theory of Thucydides for the full text:

• Greatness and power are the result of commerce; the accumulation of resources produces stable constitutions. Conversely, war and natural disasters (e.g., the plague) discourage commerce, use up resources and undermine constitutional order (compromise and inclusiveness). Both destroy greatness, quality of life and public morality [the"good life"].
• History is comprehensible in terms of known patterns of human behavior; knowledge is useful. "The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human affairs must resemble if it does not reflect it (recognizable patterns of human behavior), I shall be content. In sum, I have written my work, not as an essay that is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time. ... To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate cause that plunged the Greeks into a war of such magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable."
• Note that all the qualities we have seen that describe 'science' apply to Thucydides as well: classification, accurate observation, public presentation/discussion/critique; analogy; contradiction and autopsy.

1. The Events
   1. The decision at Sparta: It was Sparta, moved by her allies, which broke the peace. What considerations affected the decision? The best account is that given in parallel speeches of Archidamus and Sthenilaides (I, 80-88 = ACG 183). These speeches, and the public context of the debates, should be compared with one by Pericles (II, 55-65= ACG 194 and 208) on Athenian strategy. The strategic and tactical dilemma faced by each...
      1. Archidamus argues that Athens has long walls and fleet, it will be difficult to attack her effectively; moreover, Athenians can, with their fleet, attack us at will. We Spartans have no fleet with which to attack or defend and no means (money, revenues) to build one. There is, too, the danger of the helots.
      2. Stenilaides responds that we have the most powerful land army and many allies who are offended by Athens; Athens' allies are disaffected. Note that apparent cause of declaring war is that Athens broke the tready; the real cause is that Sparta cannot be an imperial power and disappoint her 'allies'. The distinction between the true and apparent causes of the war.
      3. Pericles: we have revenues, a fleet; we are then safe as if on an island. Avoid provocation: if we lose a battle our allies will defect; so don't defend land, and don't try to expand empire; do preserve resources and allies. A strategy that was based on self restraint [do not be provoked to risk battle], and attrition.
   2. The phases of the war. For a detailed chronology (also this timeline)see the textbook and ACG pp 334-6. Read also, Mary Renault, The Last of the Wine, a very pleasant way to enjoy this part of the course with one of the best historical novels ever written.
      1. In the first phase, from 432 to 424, there is rough parity as the Spartans and allies regularly invade Attica and are themselves attacked by the Athenians by sea. The capture of the Spartans at Pylos and the attacks of Brasidas in Thrace brought about a truce; but one so badly made that war was inevitable.
      2. In the second phase, 418-410, the Athenian attempt but fail to conquer Sicily [recall the advice of Pericles]; even so, they hold their own in the Aegean.
      3. In the third phase 410-404, Persia, having been assured that it will receive back the Greek cities of Anatolia, provides Sparta with the men and ships she needs to defeat the Athenians (cf. the speech of Archidamas).Note the readiness of the Spartans to betray the Greek cause to gain advantage of another Greek state = Medism
      4. The Athenian defeat was in part due to
         1. the fact that she squandered her resources at Syracuse and
         2. to the lack of effective leaders after Pericles. Too many of them were inept, immoderate, dogmatic, tyrannical or just plain treasonous; ultimately, she managed to survive these disadvantages; the is Athenian vitality, based on the energies unleased by her radial democracy [inclusion and compromise], allowed Athens to recover from her mistakes.
         3. more critical was the alliance made between Sparta and Persia for this provided the Spartans with the means (money & ships) they lacked to defeat the Athenians at sea.
   3. The Outbreak of the War
      1. Anticipated by a surprise attack of Thebans on the Athenian ally, Plataea.
      2. Hostilities begin in summer of 431, when Archidamus invades Attica and Pericles sails 100 ships around the Peloponnesus. This set the pattern for the first part of the war.
   4. The Plague (a short version of Thucydidean account) and Pericles: During invasions, all forced to withdraw within long walls. There the plague, which originated in Africa, had a terrifying effect during in 430 and 429, on both manpower (of 13,000 hoplites, 4400 died) and morale (see II, 47-65 for the full description) It did provide some relief from the Spartan incursions. Of lasting consequence was the death of Pericles.
      1. Contribution to art history
      2. As spokesman for Athenian achievement (see Funeral Oration, II, 34-46). The main argument.
      3. As political and military strategist.
   5. Other important events:
      1. End of the siege of Plataea (427); the city is raised. All the soldiers caught are killed.
      2. Phormion ensures Athenian domination of the Corinthian Gulf. Naupactos (Messenian settlement) is his base.
      3. Revolt of Mytilene --428. Not for ill treatment, she provided ships. To put down revolt, eisphora (wealth tax introduced at Athens) and tribute rises for first time. Mytilene capitulates. What to do? The debate: Cleon argues that in time of war an imperial power cannot afford to make concessions and must punish rebellion with death. Diodotus responds that such terrorist methods would not prevent rebellion, but only prolong it to bitter end. Moreover, Athenian resources and revenues would be reduced by a protracted siege. (See III, 36-50) Expediency, not morality is the issue on both sides. Mytilene loses fleet, walls and land; the latter is leased back to natives or given to cleruchs.
      4. Sedition in Corcyra (map) // 427-425 (III, 69-85): the first in a series of civic horrors which pitted oligarchic (which was ready to call in the Spartans) and the popular (which was ready to call in the Athenians) parties against one another
   6. The first ten years of the war marked by a dreary succession of invasions of Attica by the Spartans and Athenian raids on Peloponnesian coast.
      1. One of these raids, under Demosthenes, led to the fortification of the heights of Pylos; he then sails off to continue his raid. Spartans counter-attack and send a holding force to Sphacteria. When the Athenian fleet returns, 400 Spartans plus attendants are cut off on island.
      2. When the siege drags on, Cleon (the first of a succession of demagogues) offers to go in place of Nicias [his character] and to resolve the issue with the force at hand. With a massive frontal attract and a fire, he succeeds; the Spartans surrender. No one could believe it! ('return carrying your shield or being carried on it'). Shields hung on the Parthenon.
      3. With her soldier as hostages, the Spartans could do little: Attica could not be invaded.
   7. Last years of 1st Phase
      1. The Delium Campaign: a three pronged attack on Boeotia that fails miserably. One flank betrayed; Athenian hoplites no match for Boeotian levy (a deeper phalanx!). Athens no longer an imposing land force.
      2. Brasidas: an unusually gifted Spartan, both a general and as statesman. He recognizes how critical Thrace and Amphipolis were to Athenian effort (wood and metal) and applies pressure there.
      3. The 'One Year Truce'
         1. Athenians, needing time to gather their strength in Thrace, and the Spartans, still concerned about their 400 and about the personal authority of Brasidas agree to a truce in 423. Each side to retain what it currently had.
         2. Scione falls two days after the truce. Athenians demand return, Brasidas refuses. Cleon and Brasidas fight it out and both are killed.
      4. The 'Fifty Year' Peace (421).
         1. Terms:
            1. Athens to receive back Panactum, a fortress on frontier with Boeotia, and the revolted cities back into her alliance without prejudice. Their autonomy is to be guaranteed.
            2. Sparta to get back her holdings in the Peloponneseus and adjacent islands plus her 400.
         2. Truce in jeopardy for several reasons:
            1. Corinth refused to recognize Athenian holdings in Akarnania
            2. Megara refused to accept loss of her port of Nisaea
            3. Boeotia refused to give up Panactum