Economics 441/541: Public Economics.
Professor
Christopher Ellis.
Summer
2003.
This is an upper division/masters course in public
economics. The basic ideas in public economics are taught is 440/540, this
course is a topics course to introduce the student to some different areas in
the field. We shall cover
(1) Pareto efficiency and the first
fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
(2) Externalities and solutions to
externality problems.
(3) Public Choice.
(4) The Economics of the Family.
(5) Crime and Punishment.
Texts:
There is no main text for this course. Readings will be made
available to you using the following system. Most readings are available
electronically by simply clicking on the link on my web page. For those
readings not available electronically: One week before they are needed 5 copies
of these readings may be found in a folder on the door of my office 540 PLC,
you should take a copy of the readings photocopy them and return the original
to the folder.
Lecture Notes: Notes.
Assessment: Four equally weighted test (25%) held on
each Thursday of the course June 26th, July 3rd, 10th and 17th.
Office Hours: Every M, Th,
10.30-11.30.
Office Location: 540 PLC.
Contact Information: Phone # 346-4657, email cjellis@oregon.uoregon.edu.,
web page http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~cjellis/
Meeting
Time/Location: This class meets 12:00-13:50 Mondays through Thursdays in 221 McKenzie.
Detailed Outline:
(1) Pareto
efficiency and the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
Go to Booknotes.
(2) Externalities and solutions to externality problems.
a.
Ted Bergstrom’s notes. Downloadable from my web page
at Bergstrom's
Notes
b. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1960. Article.
c. Bergstrom
on Coase Bergstrom on Coase
d. Varian,
"A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents are
Well Informed." American Economic Review, 1994. Article.
e. Farrell, "Information and the Coase Theorem." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1987. Article.
(3) Public Choice.
a. Mueller, (1976): Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, June. Article.
b. Levin and Nalebuff.
1995. "An Introduction to Vote Counting Schemes," Journal of
Economic Perspectives. Winter 1995, 3-26. Article.
c. Young, "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal
of Economic Perspectives. Winter 1995, 51- 64. Article.
(4) The Economics of the Family.
a. Becker, “A Theory of Social Interactions,” Journal of Political Economy, 1974. Article.
b. Becker,
“A Theory of Marriage pt. 1,” Journal of
Political Economy, 1973. Article.
c. Becker,
“A Theory of Marriage pt. 2,” Journal of
Political Economy, 1974. Article.
d. Becker,
A Treatise on the Family.
e. Bergstrom,
T.C., “Economics in a Family Way,” Journal of Economic Literature,
December 1996, 1903--1934. Article.
f.
Bergstrom, “A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem and
Other Family Mysteries, Journal of
Political Economy, 1989. Article.
These readings are difficult; I shall simplify them for you.
(5) Crime and Punishment.
a. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach,” Journal of
Political Economy, 1968, 169--217. Article.
b. Polinsky and Shavell, ``The Optimal Tradeoff
Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic
Review, December 1979, 880- 891. Article.