I. Introduction

II. Why do negotiations succeed?

A. Type of problem

1. Some problems harder to solve than others: malign vs. benign problems

2. Coordination vs. collaboration

3. Upstream/downstream vs. tragedy of the commons

B. Structural and contextual factors:

1. "LRTAP was a creature of high politics" (Levy, 81). Soviets seeking detente.

2. Scandinavians took lead. Polluting countries (U.K., Poland and Spain) don’t sign and negotiate to prevent agreement on strong rules.

3. Rise of environmental concern in the 1960s, increase after Cold War, decrease after 9/11

C. Concern about the issue

1. Can we expect to succeed, if, "what Johannesburg did reveal in bringing all this together is that our world is badly divided on key issues: corporate responsibility, globalization and WTO, trade and subsidies, climate and energy, development priorities and aid" (Speth in Conca, ch. 13, p. 161).

2. Levels of public concern; Media attention; NGO mobilization

3. Hierarchy of other problems

4. Capacity to address problems

D. Scientific influence

1. Coordinated scientific research through EMEP helped standardize results; made science less controversial.

2. Improved standing of domestic scientists with their governments. "When LRTAP was created only two of its thirty members thought acid rain was a serious environmental problem. Now all do, and they are in the midst of an ambitious work plan to develop strict regulatory protocols" (Levy, 75).

3. Science influenced perceptions of positions: institutions promoted science (Wettestad argument) which altered state’s perceptions of their vulnerability (Levy’s argument) which led them to change policy positions (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta’s argument).

4. But 30% for all chemicals: "the 30% target itself had very little to do with science" (Wettestad, 172).

E. Actors involved: NGOs, states, entrepreneurs

F. Institutional factors

1. Process stuff: veto players, voting rules, who can participate, when meetings can be held, agenda-setting rules, institutional mandate, membership rules

2. Regular reviews of research & policies and negotiate reduction strategies. What good are reviews if governments couldn’t do anything when they found out that countries like Greece, Iceland, Poland, Spain weren’t doing anything to their emissions (Levy 119).

3. Levy’s argument is that "tote board" of positive incentives worked: urge others to do good rather than harm than for doing bad.

4. Levy argues LRTAP took "knowledge building" approach rather than regulatory approach:
CHANGE PERCEPTIONS OF INTERESTS > CHANGE BEHAVIORS
rather than
CHANGE MATERIAL INTERESTS > CHANGE BEHAVIORS

III. The case of ozone protection

A. S &V's argument: role of interests and power vs. role of scientists

1. State positions determined by costs and benefits of ozone control, costs in terms of abatement costs and benefits in terms of skin cancers avoided

2. Data critique -- don't list alphabetically -- always by some other factor, since alphabetical is never interesting.

3. Notice how both costs and benefits change over time -- perceived benefits increase as knowledge of impacts and certainty reduces; perceived costs decrease as alternative technologies become available. Both lead to less resistance to international regulation by all states over time.

B. Haas article: role of scientists

1. Role of UNEP as coordinator for negotiations

2. Epistemic community framed alternatives, advocated control, and encouraged speedy implementation (Haas, 1992, 188).

3. Note that scientists are representatives of governments in many cases, and so science-policy distinction is not as clear as one usually thinks of it as being.

4. Influence of AMERICAN scientists vs. those of other countries -- power through science rather than as opposed to science.

5. Structure of problem made negotiations somewhat easier -- 17 companies and Dupont controls 50% of US market and 25% of global market -- concentrated industry

6. Theory matters -- level of concern increased at some points (1984-85) because of theory that CFCs harmed environment and dramatic growth in CFC production, but NOT direct evidence of dramatic growth in ozone hole (Haas, 1992, 202)

7. BUT in 1985, "negotiations were galvanized by the unanticipated discovery that a dramatic thinning of the ozone layer over Antarctica occurred every autumn" (Haas, 1992, 202). Followed in 86 by WMO Ozone report that summarizes science.

8. Role of industry, especially Dupont, at saying uncertainty did not lead to conclusion to do nothing (Haas, 1992, 205). Note that industry wants: a) Multilateralism and b) incentives to develop alternatives

9. Notice that US was taking the lead on this and much of Europe and LDCs were resistant (Haas, 1992, 206).

10. Role of unilateral action on part of US -- ability to make credible and potent threats to regulate on their own regarding important market gives them negotiation power

11. Lots of negotiation of specific terms to address different countries interests (e.g., LDCs, Japan and Russia are accommodated in final rules agreed to -- basically an effort to make it not so costly that countries are unwilling to agree to rules in first place) (Haas, 1992, 212).

12. Note Haas' use of alternative explanations at end of article

C. Role of uncertainty

1. Precautionary principle -- what should you do under conditions of uncertainty

2. Costs of action as well as costs of inaction

IV. Now, consider the case of climate change – consider the following options in light of theory just delineated

A. Costs of action:

1. Ozone costs for U.S. were $2.7 Billion,

2. Climate change costs for U.S. estimated between $800 Billion and 3.6 Trillion.

B. Potential climate change agreement

1. Single agreement to cut all GHGs (CO2, plus CH4, and NOx) by 30% by 2025

2. Single agreement to cut CO2 only by 15% by 2000

3. Vague agreement with specific protocols to be negotiated later

4. Pledge and review with no binding requirements

C. Choice #1: Single or comprehensive - is linkage across issues good or bad?

1. Single: one gas or one polluting activity at a time. "Divide and conquer" approach. Avoid "blocking coalitions" formed by different sectors joining forces: forest, transport, power, rice cultivation, livestock cultivation, etc.

a) Advantages: Less complex, faster, build on success

b) Disadvantages: less efficiency, only non-affected sign on (Saudi Arabia signs forest agreement, Nepal signs auto agreement), issue loses saliency

2. Comprehensive: all gases and activities at same time

a) Advantages: addresses whole problem, "strikes while iron is hot," creates efficiency options

b) Disadvantages: mobilizes more opponents (GM, GE, General Timber, and General Rice Growers join forces)

D. Choice #2: Few actors or universal

1. Few developed nations make strong agreement before action by others.

a) Advantages: more manageable; deeper cuts; less conflict in values; major problem sources act first; "sets an example"; avoids lowest common denominator; start small and grow

b) Disadvantage: rest on laurels; not addressing future problem before they develop

2. Universal agreement:

a) Advantage: addresses all the current and future sources of problem

b) Disadvantages: long and complex negotiations; major conflicts and possible impasse; weaker and vaguer agreement

3. Actors to involve in negotiations themselves:

a) Governments; NGOs; businesses; scientists; secretariat. Each can play different role

b) Different types and amounts of power: power to pollute or harm ecosystem not in hands of traditionally powerful.

c) Different views represented: governmental interests; economic; political interests; future generations; non-human interests

E. Choice #3: Fixed targets or renegotiable

1. Renegotiable: ratchet down over time, but need a schedule; start small so opposition is low but create automatic process for ratcheting down

2. Fixed targets: more certainty, but less action. Action level determined by political not environmental needs. But if accept what can accomplish today, then removes impetus for action.

F. Choice #4: Binding treaty (hard law) or informal guidelines (soft law)

1. Action plans and soft laws: not likely to raise blocking coalitions but less likely to produce action; Pledge and review process; If don’t require anything, there is no basis for opposition; but less incentive for and expectation of action

2. Hard law: greater resistance but more action once passed.

G. Choice #5: WEO

H. Different approaches yield different "development of negotiation" curves

V. Conclusion