PS420/520: International Organization

I. Intro

A. Overview of problem structure in logical format

B. Different than in syllabus but readings will work

C. This lecture will most likely go into lecture #4

D. On Stein, 317-318, he talks about differences between regimes and institutions and international organization but you can disregard that for purposes of this class. It contradicts what I said in 1st week.

II. Background #1 -- three types of interaction among states

A. Underlying element is that there is some degree of interdependence, i.e., simply that what one country does affects the well-being of other countries.

B. Harmony – INdependent decision-making produces desirable or "good" outcomes, i.e., to outcomes that those actors with the ability to push for change find sufficiently acceptable that they don’t push for change. No need for international organization -- there is no problem that needs resolution.

1. Most IR theorists view these situations as common but UNinteresting.

2. Recently, constructivists have argued that, states may "get along" because of deep-seated norms that have developed over time that "construct" their identities and desires in ways that lead them to want the same things and hence get along. Example: lack of conflict over colonization.

C. Conflict - INdependent decision-making produces undesirable, suboptimal, or "bad" outcomes, i.e., to outcomes that those actors with the ability to push for change find sufficiently UNacceptable that they push for change. See Stein on this.

1. Realist view: if states find themselves here, can’t remedy it. Cases where one or more parties feels that its well-being is influenced (negatively) by the behaviors of other parties and hence there would be opportunities to improve their well-being if they can get the other party to change their behavior.

2. Various types of conflict exist that could benefit from remedies -- will discuss in coming classes

D. Cooperation – INTERdependent decision-making produces desirable or "good" outcomes. Cooperation involves two intertwined elements. Stein (1982) says: "as long as international state behavior results from unconstrained and independent decision making, there is no international regime."

1. Stein nicely defines a regime as any situation in which there is interdependent decision-making. See p. 317 example on arms races with and without a regime.

2. Integrative bargaining: Should we create a bigger pie? What type of bigger pie should we create? How do we create a bigger pie?

3. Distributive bargaining: Who should contribute ingredients for the pie? Once we make the pie bigger, who should get the additional parts of the pie we create?

4. Cooperation is "international organization", i.e., what comes out of efforts to address one of the various types of conflict just outlined.

III. Background #2 -- two logics by which states appear to make choices about behavior

A. Logic of consequences: Calculation of benefits against costs, with variation in what costs and benefits are counted

1. Independent self-interest (narrow)

a) Treaties are negotiated to reflect state interests. So, no surprise states do what is in their interests. The strong agree to do what they would anyway, and the weak agree to do what the strong are going to make them do anyway, to paraphrase Thucydides.

b) No change required in behavior: codifies existing behavior - leader states already complying; Attempt to prevent future behavior

c) Require already planned future behaviors

d) Vague and ambiguous rules

e) Hegemonic power has incentives to comply - rules reflect their interests

2. Independent self-interest (broad)

a) Uncertainty and unknown side-effects

b) Fear of public opinion

c) Efficiency of decision-making: rational to keep cost of decision-making down; satisficing and SOPs

3. Interdependent self-interest

a) Coordination games - easy

b) Collaboration games - harder but still possible through 1) Hegemonic enforcement or 2) Reputation effects

B. Logic of appropriateness: Norms and roles: two different pathways and mechanisms -

1. Regimes alter sense of what right thing is to do, and actors change their behavior because they perceive it as legitimately the "right" thing to do, with little calculation of interests - other behaviors not even considered

2. Behavior perceived as way to achieve particular "social identity" end, i.e., to be perceived by others as a certain "type" of actor, e.g., act in certain ways so that other states perceive you and respond to you as a state with a "liberal economy," or a "green" state, or to avoid being viewed as a "rogue" state or as a "third world" state. Material ends are less important than social identity.

IV. Elements of problem structure

A. Young in readings for next Thursday's class, argues that it would be hard to select or develop a single scale by which to determine whether had easy or hard particular problems are but instead argues for considering various parameters or aspects of the problem (Young, 1999, 51). Young also notes that what makes a problem difficult to negotiate a solution to may be different from what makes a problem difficult in terms of compliance and enforcement.

B. No need to have a single dimension, which would not be valuable even if we had it. Instead what to think about the different dimensions of a problem and their implications for what sorts of solutions will be required to address them.

C. Several aspects of the problem structure:

1. What capacities and opportunities exist to engage in good and bad behavior?

2. What types of interdependence exist among countries -- how do consequences for each country of its behavior depend on behavior of other countries?

3. What imperfections in knowledge and information exist for the actors involve, regarding the consequences of engaging in certain behaviors and about the behaviors that other actors are engaged in?

4. What norms exist that push states toward or away from good behaviors?

V. Sequence of questions we can ask to determine the elements of problem structure

A. Different problem structures are likely to lead to different types of international organization to resolve the problem. What kind of regime is adopted by states depends on what kind of problem is being addressed. "In sum, different cooperation problems lead us to expect different solutions" [Martin, 1992 #1964, 782].

B. To keep things simple for starters, just imagine there are two countries in the world, named Country R and Country C (the reasons for these names will become obvious later)

C. Question 1: Do countries believe that the behavior of the other countries influence their "well-being" in a negative way? I.e., does one country see others as engaging in "bad" behavior? Are states interdependent?

1. If not, there is no problem that needs addressing -- this is "harmony"

2. Examples:

a) Countries' policies regarding what form of democratic government they have

b) Countries' policies regarding how to educate their citizens

c) Countries' policies regarding house construction methods and building and zoning rules

3. If so, there is some form of "conflict" due to the EXTERNALITY (i.e., one state engages in a behavior that has external effects on other states). Externalities can be either positive or negative.

4. If there is conflict, is either side willing to do something to mitigate it. If not, you have a Deadlock (Pure Conflict or Zero Sum) problem. Is conflict due to a situation/context in which each actor is not interested in "maximizing their own gains" but instead want to "maximize the difference between their own returns and those of others" (Stein, 1982, 318). That is, for there to be a resolvable problem, countries must be in a absolute gains rather than relative gains mindset, i.e., do they evaluate consequences by comparing their payoffs or eventual position relative to their prior position or by comparing relative to others. Example:

a) Territorial disputes. Both sides would prefer to keep fighting because they believe they can win than to stop fighting. Both sides would prefer other stop fighting but are unwilling to give enough in exchange for that to happen.

D. Question 2: Do countries "causing the problem" have opportunities and the capacity to engage in "good" behavior?

1. If not, then we have our first form of problem: a Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity problem. Remember that, in all these cases, there is only an international problem if some other country believes that the behavior of the country "causing the problem" influences its well-being.

2. Examples:

a) Ability to protect nuclear weapons from accidental detonation -- newer nuclear powers do not have technology in place to protect nuclear weapons from being detonated accidentally. It is in the interest of both the countries with the weapons and other countries' that they have such technology.

b) Ability to reduce AIDS infection rates in developing countries, particularly in Africa -- many of these countries lack the capacity to provide effective drugs against AIDS. It is in the interests of those countries and other countries that they control AIDS.

c) Ability of small countries to defend themselves from attack. It was in the interests of European states and the US to protect Europe from attack from the Soviet Union.

3. Notice that, here, the behavior of the state causing the problem is not the result of EITHER a logic of consequences or an logic of appropriateness. It does not even involve a choice. The state's failure to engage in a good behavior reflects simply the fact that it canNOT do so, rather than that it chooses not to do so.

4. If so, then further questions to ask

E. Question 3: How do the material consequences for the countries "causing the problem" of engaging in bad behaviors depend on the behavior of other countries? Three possibilities, from Country R's perspective, if country C were to engage in good behavior:

1. Consequences for perpetrators do not depend on other countries: Country R would be unaffected (Country R's behavior affects Country C but not vice versa) - Upstream/Downstream Problem. Examples:

a) Human rights abuses -- a country that is abusing its citizen's human rights generally is indifferent to what human rights abuses may be occurring in other countries

b) Pollution by an upriver or upwind state or simply by any state that contributes to a problem but is not concerned about that problem (e.g., OPEC with respect to climate change)

c) Access to military bases in Turkey: here the US wants military base rights in Turkey to engage in Persian Gulf War.

d) This seems similar to a Rambo Problem in Rittberger/Zürn's terms. One of the countries has complete control over an issue and the other country has no related ability to influence its behavior. In these cases, country that dislikes behavior may have to bring other power resources to bear on the state engaged in the bad behavior.

2. Consequences for perpetrators are BETTER from engaging in good behavior if other countries do so: Country R would benefit from Country C doing so and Country R would only harm itself if country C engages in good behavior but Country R does not -- Coordination Problem. Krasner argues that here the major problem is one of distribution. Examples:

a) Universal language for international air traffic control -- what is the best language to teach your pilots and air traffic controllers depends on what language other pilots and air traffic controllers are being trained in.

b) Satellite slot allocation and radio wave allocation -- once one country is using a satellite slot or a certain part of radio waves, it is not worthwhile for other countries to simultaneously try to use it.

c) Any sort of standard-setting, e.g., with computer communications

d) This corresponds more or less to Rittberger/Zürn (mentioned as Tubingen group in Young's chapter) notion of "conflicts over means"

e) Variant of this problem is a Suasion Problem. In this case, one of the countries is more powerful and that country has interest in engaging in good behavior regardless of whether other countries do but that country can use its power to get other countries to engage in good behavior even though those other countries are better off not doing so, given that powerful country will do so anyway. Example:

(1) Bretton Woods agreements and US having to cover much of costs of supporting free trade and strong world economic situation after WWII.

(2) "Burden sharing" with respect to covering the costs of protection of western Europe from the Soviet threat.

(3) Removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus after fall of Soviet Union.

(4) Cleaning up of dangerous nuclear reactors in eastern Europe after Chernobyl.

3. Consequences for perpetrators are WORSE from engaging in good behavior if other countries do so: Country R would benefit from Country C doing so BUT Country R would benefit even more if it can get country C to engage in the good behavior while Country R does not -- Collaboration Problems. Krasner argues that here the major problem is one of redressing "market failure." Examples:

a) Arms races of any sort, nuclear, biological, chemical. Whether or not other side has weapons, its always better to have them yourself (you can always decide not to use them).

b) Trade wars. Whether or not other side has high tariffs, its always better to have them yourself to protect your own industry (if you take only the perspective of the import-competing sector -- see example in epistemic problem section below for alternative perspective).

c) Overfishing. Whether or not other side has cuts back on their fishing, its always better to fish more yourself today.

4. Note that issues here involve a logic of consequences calculation by the state involved. Countries are calculating what is in their best interests based on looking at the net benefits (benefits - costs) of bad behavior relative to the net benefits of the good behavior and choosing that behavior which has the greatest net benefits.

F. Question 4: Are there consequences for those "causing the problem" from their behaviors that are both unknown and are such that they would make engaging in the good behavior more attractive than engaging in the bad behavior, regardless of what other countries do? Perpetrating country's behavior causes problems for other countries but also causes problems for itself which they are unaware of but which, if they knew about them, would cause them to stop the bad behavior.

1. If not, then simply falls back to the consequences issue of Question 3

2. If so, then have an Epistemic/Knowledge Problem. This has to do with knowledge about the consequences of one's behavior. Examples:

a) Problem of acid rain in Europe, prior to knowledge of its consequences: states engaged in pollution which, although it harmed other states also had large costs even for the states doing the polluting. If they had known about those costs, they would have stopped/reduced pollution regardless of what other countries did.

b) Trade wars. Beggar-thy-neighbor policies. States thought policies of imposing high tariffs to block imports would increase domestic output but, instead, it led other countries to block their exports and led to reduced overall international trade with the result that things actually got worse overall economically rather than better.

c) Quarantine regulations that Stein (1982, 321) talks about. States excluded based on political bases rather than scientific ones (e.g., Italians hold Greeks in port because dislike Greeks rather than because Greeks are likely to have cholera).

3. Variant of this problem is Assurance Problem. This has to do with knowing what behavior the other state is engaged in. In this case, country recognizes that secrecy and lack of transparency about its own behavior may lead to bad outcomes for itself but doesn't want to be taken advantage of in reverse. Each state wants to reassure the other that its not engaged in a behavior that the other state wouldn't like. Best action for one state depends on what other state is doing and if don't know or are uncertain about what other state is doing, you might make a mistake and misinterpret. Examples:

a) War games and pre-announcing them. Each country wants to make sure that other state knows it is only doing a war game and not actually attacking.

4. Note that issues here ALSO and STILL involve a logic of consequences calculation by the state involved. Countries are calculating what is in their best interests based on looking at the net benefits (benefits - costs) of bad behavior relative to the net benefits of the good behavior and choosing that behavior which has the greatest net benefits.

G. Question 5: Are the consequences from those "causing the problem" not material in nature but other countries, even though they are not affected in a material way, nonetheless consider it bad and illegitimate for the other country to behave in that way? Are there judgments about what behaviors are appropriate for states to engage in and what behaviors it is not appropriate for states to engage in.

1. If so, then have a Normative Problem. Country C may see other countries (country R) as engaged in behaviors that do not have any material impacts on country C but which country C believes are immoral or illegitimate behaviors and wants country R to stop engaging in simply because it is "wrong" from Country C's perspective. Examples:

a) Human rights abuses. Generally do not have material impacts on other states but are simply viewed as normatively wrong from the view of those other states.

b) Apartheid or treatment of woman. Treatment of citizens may not have any direct effects in other countries but those countries may still attempt to involve themselves in the "internal affairs" of those other countries.

c) Choice of government. Response to dictatorships by democracies or religious states by non-religious states.

d) Note that norms often are developed and fostered not by states but by nongovernmental actors.

e) This corresponds more or less to Rittberger/Zürn (mentioned as Tubingen group in Young's chapter) notion of "conflicts over values"

2. If not, then there is no problem but note that, if this is the case, states are engaged in good behavior due to a logic of appropriateness, not a logic of consequences. Countries are NOT choosing their behaviors based on calculation of net benefits of bad behavior relative to good behaviors but INSTEAD are choosing behaviors based on determining what identity or role they want to have, what behaviors other actors examine before providing them with that identity, and what norms exist about certain behaviors.

VI. The role for international organization

A. Essential role for states to organize internationally, i.e., for international organization, to form an international regime, or to create an international institution, is:

1. To create "Pareto improvement" -- i.e., to make at least one member country better off without making any member country worse off.

2. However, power can be used to create international institutions that, in fact, violate the rule of Pareto improvement

3. Pareto improvement assumes true voluntary membership which is not always the case.

VII. Conclusion

A. Capacities and opportunities for good and bad behaviors

B. Types of interdependence among countries

C. Imperfections in knowledge and information regarding consequences and behaviors of others

D. Norms about good and bad behavior

E. Several types of problems that arise based on how these play out.