PS420/520: International Organization

I. Introduction

II. Effectiveness, compliance and Implementation

A. Effectiveness of CITES ivory ban

1. CITES "effective" in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe but not in other range states – what explains this?

B. Role of NGOs

1. More active than in other issue areas (though perhaps similar to human rights), and particularly in monitoring arenas. Possible explanation of why: behavior being regulated is largely by private actors and so allowing NGOs to "blow the whistle" does not involve accusations against governments so much as accusations about private actors.

2. Provide considerable aid on their own, without regimes. Debt-for-nature swaps were innovative idea, although unlikely to be big component of problem since problem is so large. Governments imitated NGO debt-for-nature swaps. Role of policy innovation by NGOs

C. Role of certification and information

1. CITES reciprocal acceptance of national certificates

2. Prior informed consent provisions – making sure the market is operating appropriately (e.g., hazardous wastes, pesticides, other chemicals)

3. Forestry Stewardship Council certification of sustainable forestry

D. Monitoring by governments or NGOs sometimes occurs

1. TRAFFIC has played important role in CITES but so have national customs agencies

E. Sources of noncompliance: Intention; Incapacity; Inadvertence

F. Need for ongoing science to ensure addressing correct problem in correct ways

G. Reactions to noncompliance

1. Tolerating noncompliance

a) Different than nuclear weapons agreements

2. Difficulty of identifying violations

a) "Passive voice" violations of whaling treaty – quota was for all states so that quota "was violated" but could not specify who violated it

b) Governments disinclined to accuse other governments and NGOs rarely have standard to sue governments

3. Sanctions have been used, but rarely

a) Banning membership, removing voting rights

b) Economic sanctions in retaliation for environmental violations, but not used frequently because of Tragedy of the Commons problems (enforcement costs paid by enforcer but benefits accrue to all, so nobody wants to help sanction)

c) NGOs can impose sanctions in form of public shaming, etc. that are costly to governments and MNCs

4. Positive incentives can work well as can capacity building approaches

III. Comparing three environmental regimes. Which worked best? Whaling, Fur Seals, or Montreal Protocol

A. First question: do they have the same problem structure?

1. Need to ensure same or similar problem structure before can compare convincingly. Why? Not least because need to know that all solution types were possible. Wouldn't be true if compared up/down to ToC

2. Number of actors

3. Capacities of actors to engage in

4. Incentives (pre-institutional) to engage in good and bad behaviors - perps vs. victims, based on incentives and capacity

5. Transparency

6. Normative defensibility

B. Potential solutions to Tragedy of the Commons

1. Internalize externality – charge "user fee" corresponding to social costs of use

2. Privatize the commons

3. "Mutual restraint mutually agreed upon" – Hardin

4. Provide incentives for actors not to engage in bad activity

C. Differences in actual solutions -- if have same problem structures, then can explain differences in outcomes based on differences in solutions

1. Membership differences

2. Incentive structures AFTER institution formed - are there still incentives to engage in bad behavior

3. Primary rule system: ban or limitations

4. Information system: is clandestine cheating possible/easy, easy or hard to get information

5. Response system: type, retaliatory noncompliance sensible, goal of response system, targetable responses, incentives to follow through on response, normative issues

6. Capacity issues?

D. Effects and effectiveness

1. Look at charts

2. Graph Sources:

a) Fur Seals: Ryan Slunaker Honors Thesis, Political Science, University of Oregon, May 2005

b) Whaling: Peterson, M. J., Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists and the International Management of Whaling, 46 International Organization 147 (1992).

c) Montreal Protocol: Mitchell graph of data from secretariat

3. How do we estimate counterfactuals in each?

IV. Conclusions