PS420/520: International Organization

I. Introduction

A. Read final exam

B. Select examples based on the type of problem and then write about the problem, the efforts to solve that problem, and the effects and effectiveness of those efforts at solution. It will NOT be as good to pick an organization or an institution to evaluate, since it will be less clear what the problem is. Thus, instead of picking Amnesty International as your human rights example, pick "torture and political prisoners" and start by describing that problem, then describing various efforts to resolve it (including treaties, Amnesty International, and others as well), and then discuss how effective those efforts have been, using both counterfactual and goal achievement as your standards.

II. Effects and effectiveness (see graphs at end of lecture)

A. Counterfactuals

FOR SLIDES FROM THIS LECTURE, CLICK HERE

1. How do you know if agreement had an effect?

2. Members vs. non-members

3. Before vs. after

4. Member behavior in unregulated activities

B. Other drivers of behavior and outcomes: Alternative explanations about drivers other than agreement of thing being effected. For example, if looking at effect of agreement on levels of trade, need to think about other factors that influence trade levels that might have changed over same period of time

C. Reasons for compliance and noncompliance

1. Inherent elements of agreement

a) Independent self-interest narrowly defined

b) Independent self-interest broadly defined

c) Interdependent self-interest

2. Manipulated elements of agreements

a) Coercion

b) Positive incentives

c) Information

D. Sources of noncompliance (of which violation is a subset)

1. Interests and intention, i.e., violation

2. Incapacity (want to comply but can’t)

3. Inadvertence (try to comply but fail)

E. Considering the "difficulty of the problem" when comparing effects

1. Consider differences in underlying problem structure as possible major source of difference - are some problems (e.g., coordination) easier to solve than others? If so, should we consider a big change in behavior in response to a coordination agreement as a "bigger" effect or smaller effect than a smaller change in a harder area to regulate like upstream/downstream problem. In short, think about difficulties of problems before considering effects of solutions

F. Reactions to noncompliance and processes by which agreements might have made a difference

1. Coercion

a) Explicit delineation of coercion is rare in agreements and actual use is even rarer

b) Economic and, less often, military sanctions often discussed and can be effective

c) Even if would be effective if applied, often there are strong incentives not to apply

d) NGOs and MNCs and even individuals as consumers may apply even when states don’t

e) States sometimes have incentives to respond (trade and arms control cases) but other times don’t (human rights or environment issues)

2. Managing capacity problems

a) Financial aid and technical assistance can help if incapacity is a problem, deterrence and coercion unlikely to work effectively

b) Giving extended timelines to compliance can help

3. Positive incentives

a) Assistance induces more information in system than coercion – and information in itself may be valuable – may want to know what’s going on even if can’t really effect it

b) Assistance runs risk of moral hazard problems

4. Use of information

a) Just publicizing noncompliance can work – see performance reviews above. "Mobilizing latent enforcers and rewarders" process.

b) How much shaming works depends on state involved and context of issue

c) NGOs often use shaming far more than states do – single issue nature of NGOs means they have to make fewer tradeoffs and so are more likely to sanction in general

5. Norms and their influence - slow but perhaps deep change over time

a) Creation of norms as in Human Rights cases

b) Normative aspects of other arenas - as an alternative explanation - non-use of nuclear weapons

c) Reference to pre-existing norms, as in Transparency International case

G. Distinguishing compliance from effectiveness – get overall agreement to work and goals to be achieved rather than getting compliance, per se, necessarily. Keep focus on forests of effectiveness (are we achieving goals) rather than trees of compliance (are actors obeying the rules)

H. Alternatives to intergovernmental agreements

1. Industry self-regulation can be forerunner of intergovernmental action

2. Coordination of NGOs and corporations

a) Transparency International working with corporations on bribery codes of conduct

b) NGOs working with corporations for human rights and labor rights

c) NGOs working with corporations for environmental regulation

3. Selective self-regulation – get those who are willing to move first and others may follow

a) "Islands of integrity" with respect to bribery

b) Green nations move first

4. Regulation by information

a) Transparency International actions

b) Human rights NGOs

c) Basically simply revealing information can work sometimes

5. Direct action partnerships and networks

a) Multiple actors coordinating in pursuit of their interests

b) Debt for nature swaps among banks, governments, and NGOs

c) NGOs working with corporations to provide drugs in various countries