

Lecture 7
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- I. Introduction
 - A. Balance of Power theory
 - B. World War I
 - C. World War I
- II. Balance of Power theory
 - A. Theory - Three definitions of BoP:
 - 1. Description of distribution of existing power between states: assessment of each state's relative power capabilities
 - 2. Conscious policy and set of principles intended by states to achieve BoP, provide for survival, and preserve system
 - a) Concert of Europe from 1815-1870 of five or six major European states consciously striving to balance power to provide for own survival. Increasing power of Germany from 1870-1907 followed by bipolar set of alliances from 1907-1914
 - b) Balance threat rather than power, so distance, interdependence, and ideology matter
 - c) External balancing through alliances but risks dependency and requires trust: Melians and Sparta, NATO, Warsaw Pact
 - d) Internal balancing by building own capacities - US-Soviet arms race
 - 3. Unintended consequence driven by international system structure
 - a) Balancing occurs whenever have anarchic, self-help system and desire to survive. Balance and peace as unintended consequence of search for survival.
 - b) Balance results from states seeking independence, not seeking peace or preservation of system.
 - c) "Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer" (Waltz, 1979, p. 127).
 - d) States ally with those who can NOT dominate them to avoid domination by those who can.
 - e) Regardless of what states seek, the system drives them to balance each other.
 - 4. Bandwagoning behavior instead of balancing if:
 - a) Weak neighbor state realizes balancing won't protect, so bandwagons
 - b) State can find no ally with
 - c) Victor becomes clear to avoid being on the losing side
 - B. Characteristics of polarity and balancing
 - 1. Number of poles
 - a) Unipolar - hegemony, US today?, China
 - b) Bipolar - Cold War, Athens and Sparta.
 - c) Multipolar - Europe during 1800s, near future?
 - 2. Degree of polarization
 - a) Tightness of poles - all states in one camp or other?
 - b) Discreteness of poles - degree of interaction between states on each side
 - c) Level of animosity - degree of animosity
 - 3. Relationship to war.
 - a) Truly unipolar system: makes major war less frequent, since state strong enough to dominate system can prevent others from arming for war.
 - b) War as likely during transitions in balance. Rising power gains strength, challenges previously superior state and, given newness of capabilities, war occurs because each side thinks it can win.
 - C. Doyle's second level argument about liberal states
 - 1. Structure not determining. Factors at second/state level influence likelihood of conflict.
 - 2. Argument = NOT that liberal states don't go to war, but that liberal states don't go to war with each other. Separate peace among liberal states.
 - 3. Political bond of respect between citizens of these states. Based in philosophical belief that all democratic states have right to non-interference, self-determination, and independence from intervention.

III. World War I - History

- A. Late 1800s/early 1900s: flexible multipolar balance of power system between France, Germany, Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy becomes rigid bipolar alliance of Britain, France, and Russia (Triple Entente), and Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary (Triple Alliance).
- B. Encircled by Triple Entente, Germany has economic growth and expands navy to use resources and divert domestic focus on external issues. Growing German power threatens Britain and France (Athens/Sparta). Britain wants to avoid war but has to prevent German preponderance of power on Continent so engages in naval arms race.
- C. Italy expansionist goals
- D. Balkans, (former Yugoslavia), rising Serbian nationalism. Controlled by Turks and Ottoman Empire finally rebel in 1912 and form own state. Austro-Hungarians fear Serb nationalism will pose domestic problems, since had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Serbs seek alliance with Russians.
- E. 1914: Serb nationalist in Sarajevo (in Austro-Hungary) kills Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to Austro-Hungarian throne. Austro-Hungarians receive German support against Serbia in threatening Serbia; Russia comes to Serbian defense. Austria declares war on Serbia, bombs Belgrade and the Russians mobilize.
- F. Germany demands Russia back down, they don't, and Germans declare war on Russia. British and French consider as threat on Triple Entente and expression of growing German power. In five days, Germany has declared war on France and France and Britain have declared war on Germany.

IV. World War I - Causes

- A. Deep causes: systemic or structural causes
 - 1. Increasing power of Germany. Page 59 of Nye.
 - 2. Less flexible alliance structure.
- B. Intermediate causes: state characteristics and policies as causes
 - 1. Concerns about encirclement and expansionist policies
 - 2. Serb nationalism threatening to Austro-Hungary. Assassination as excuse, not cause.
 - 3. Domestic German problems lead to adventurism and expansionism
 - 4. Complacency about need to balance (as conscious policy)
- C. Proximate causes: individual actions as causes
 - 1. Poor leadership of Austro-Hungary, Russia, and Germany. Unskilled diplomats and executives with incompetent and ambitious advisers.
 - 2. Assassination came at bad time. If occurred few years later, stronger Russian forces might have deterred Germany from aiding Austro-Hungary. But other causes might have been found.
- D. Caused by unwanted spiral of hostilities, states with poor leaders and difficult domestic political problems in increasingly polarized international system prove unable to resolve conflicts peacefully and make many strategic errors that throw fuel, not water on fire.
- E. 15 million people die; Austro-Hungarian empire divided up.
- F. Use counterfactuals to sort out causes. Nye uses counterfactuals for both whether war or not and type of war that was fought.
- G. Not accidental war. Due to intentional acts and by structural factors.

V. End of World War I, response to it, and runup to World War II

- A. Austro-Hungary divided into smaller states; Germany and Russia devastated by war; France, Britain, Italy, and U.S. begin to dominate international system. Reverts to multipolar system.
- B. U.S. joins war in 1917, Germans defeated in 1918. Treaty of Versailles' three main clauses:
 - 1. Germans guilty for all death and devastation of war.
 - 2. Germans pay \$33 billion in reparations for damage, large sum, especially given destruction of economy from war.
 - 3. Limit of 100,000 troops in uniform.
- C. Disillusionment with balance of power as means of preserving peace. Until World War I, balance of power system viewed as proper and effective at preserving sovereignty and peace. Idealist backlash calling for international law and institutions to check use of force in international sphere. League of Nations formed to provide collective security for any state victim of aggressor state.
- D. League philosophy: war and use of force can be tamed by international institutions.
 - 1. Focus on intentions and policies, not capacities of states
 - 2. League would wait for aggression to occur and then would create coalition of states against it. Didn't try to identify aggressors before they took action.

3. League as moral conscience of the world.
4. Mechanisms of League
 - a) Rules against aggression (but not capacity). "Indivisible peace."
 - b) Collective deterrence to prevent war
 - c) Collective sanctions (from economic to military) as response to those not deterred.
- E. Germans allowed into League in 1924, but made to sign Treaty of Locarno in 1925 that required:
 1. Germany not violate French/Belgian border
 2. Germany pull all troops out of industrial Ruhr area
 3. Germany submit to arbitration before changing borders with Czechs and Poles
- F. Germans failed to make reparations and French moved into Ruhr until Germans made reparations.
- G. 1930: National Socialist Party or Nazis win the German elections.
- H. 1931: Japanese take Manchuria and set up puppet state, violating League and 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing all war
 1. League doesn't respond with sanctions or force
 2. Manchuria clear case of aggression, but as Japan grows in power, no states respond or balance.
- VI. 1935: Ethiopia crisis as Italy incites conflict and invades to colonize and control area. League does respond quickly, within eight days recommending that all states impose economic embargo to prevent military goods, loans, and other imports to Italy and all exports coming out. But weak response since steel, coal, and other critical elements excluded from embargo, and many major states want to remain on good terms with Italy as potential ally to respond to growing German threat. Wanted Italy to help balance German power. Despite League philosophy, states still operating under balance of power assumptions.
 - A. 1936: Germans break Locarno treaty and move into Rhineland.
 - B. 1939: international system once again polarized: Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan arrayed against Allies of France, Britain, Russia, and the U.S.
- VII. World War II - History. Planned aggression vs. accidental war of WWI.
 - A. Hitler's four policy options in late 1930s:
 1. Take no action
 2. Diplomatic efforts to rewrite Versailles and Locarno
 3. Economic power as basis for imperial expansion
 4. Aggressive military tactics for expansion.
 - B. Four phases of war: First phase (1933-1936) - Preparation
 1. Withdraw from League; break Locarno treaty moving troops back into Rhineland/Ruhr; made states less concerned about Ethiopia; denounced Versailles limits on troop levels; splits Allies by offering British naval armaments treaty.
 - C. Second phase (1936-1940) - expansion into smaller neighbors and internal expansion and preparation for war.
 1. 1938: Germans take over Vienna and Austria. Then, like Athens and Melos, Hitler demands return of German-speaking Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, appealing to German nationalism and German-speakers right to self-determination. Czechs mobilize and Hitler vows to destroy them. British prime minister Neville Chamberlain goes to Munich and signs agreement with Hitler that British will not attack Hitler if stops with Sudetenland and doesn't take rest of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain as architect of "appeasement." Six months later, Hitler takes over Prague and all of Czechoslovakia.
 2. 1939: Hitler duplicates this in Poland. Claims German-speakers around Danzig (Gdansk) also deserve national determination. French and British offer Poles security guarantees. Hitler negotiates with Stalin to divide Poland up, with Stalin agreeing that Hitler can do whatever he wants in W. Europe. By Sept. 1, Hitler overruns half of Poland and two weeks later, Stalin invades remaining half of Poland. British and French declare war on Germany.
 - D. Third phase (1940): Blitzkrieg in which, in month between April and May of 1940, Germans invade Norway, Holland, Belgium, north of France and push British back across English channel.
 - E. Fourth phase (1941-1945): overreach, tries to destroy British air force at same time as attacking Russians. If had succeeded at first, could have succeeded at second, but first failed. Japan bombs Pearl Harbor in 1941 and Germany declares war against U.S. more to keep Japan as an ally than anything else.
 - F. Japan faces choices also. Strong nationalist and expansionist sentiments. Could expand power in region either by moving west to take over part of Soviet Union, moving south to take over Indonesian oil, or moving east against U.S. to prevent attack. Japanese decide against first because Soviets not a threat due

to preoccupation with protecting western borders. US embargoed oil to Japan and increasingly felt that war with the US was inevitable and best option was preemptive attack.

G. Results of war: 35-50 million people dead, twice that of World War I.

VIII. World War II - Causes

A. Different causes than World War I.

B. Systemic level causes:

1. Effects of First World War: states "checked out" of balance of power responsibilities. Russia: Marxist ideology that wars between capitalist states were likely and good from standpoint of promoting communism. America: reverts to traditional isolationism with Atlantic protecting the immoral war-waging of Europe. Balance of power "allows for war or violations of self-determination if that is the only way to preserve independence" (Nye, 82).
2. WWI treaties too harsh and too lenient: make Germans morally and economically responsible for WWI damage (incentives to go to war) but allow them capacity to rebuild strength too quickly (capacity to go to war).

C. State level causes:

1. Poorly planned policies. Effort to lay all blame on Germans for WWI backfired by making other European powers feel had been too harsh, e.g., British appeasement. Russians short-sighted in efforts to bargain with Hitler and allow power to grow.
2. Stalin pact with Hitler without realizing downside
3. Strong nationalist fervor in Germany and Japan that played important role in expansionism.
4. Economic collapse of Great Depression: unemployment produced support for German nationalism and weakened power of democracies
5. US isolationism – FDR and others were initially isolationist and even after that changed, the American public still wanted to stay out

D. Individual level causes:

1. Hitler as major cause of war: aggressive, expansionist, nationalist ideology at core of philosophy and goals for Germany.
2. Appeasement and misperceptions by Chamberlain, et al., to understand Hitler.
3. Poor theory of Wilson and LoN.
4. Japanese miscalculation of power vis-à-vis US

E. Wake of war: alliances shift to polarized bipolar system with strong, tight, disparate alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

F. If WWI is undesired spiral of hostilities, WWII is failure of states to deter and balance aggressive, expansionist states before become too powerful.

IX. Conclusions: war and its causes

A. Frequency of war: 5500 years of recorded history: 14,500 wars. 278 from 1480 to 1940. 224 from 1816 to 1980.

B. Several causes of war (Farnsworth, 1992):

1. Human nature - nature or learned, but natural, similar to argument that men are more prone than women
2. Balance of power theory - imbalances cause war, equilibrium causes peace.
3. Presence of arms and efforts by states to build up their own forces because they feel threatened.
4. Number of states in system - both directions: some argue more equal powers equals less war; others like Waltz that fewer is better
5. Demands of domestic system - capitalism: capitalist economies battle over rights to resources in periphery; economic competition: between competing economic systems; colonial wars: capitalists against the colonies;
6. Nationalism - feeling of support a person feels for his or her own country and other people who live there. And excitation theory - working people into a frenzy
7. Bad leadership and policy choices