I. Introduction

A. Final paper and theory building – evaluating theories of causation by clarifying what the theory expects to observe and seeing whether these "predictions" are true by looking at appropriate "empirical" cases. Testing hypotheses. Hence, better to start with theory and look for cases than vice versa, altho either is ok. Just that starting with cases is harder (harder to identify appropriate theory given a case than to identify an appropriate case given a theory, though even latter can be hard)

II. Causes of regime formation

A. AT LEAST four ways to frame question

1. Why regimes form? What factors, when present, cause a regime to form and, when absent, inhibit a regime from forming?

a) Could find evidence for this by looking at two issue areas (not at regimes) that are similar in all respects but that differ with respect to that variable or factor and seeing whether, the case in which the variable has one value, the regime exists and in the case where the variable has the opposite value, no regime exists. Could compare two different fisheries that seem similar in many ways but one of which has a regime and one of which doesn't and see what the explanatory factor is.

2. When will a regime form? What factors become present just before a regime forms and cause it to form when it couldn't have formed previously?

a) Could find evidence for this by looking at a single issue area (not at a regime) and seeing whether, when the hypothesized variable changes its value, the regime, shortly thereafter, comes into being. For example, could look at the Convention on Torture and see what factors changed and which stayed the same before and after it was agreed to, paying particular attention to earlier periods when it was attempted to be formed.

3. What makes a regime likely to form? What factors, when present, make it more likely that a regime will form or bring us closer to a regime forming then when they are absent?

a) Could find evidence for this by looking at a set of issue areas to see whether regimes form most (but not all) of the time when a particular factor is present but not otherwise. For example, could look at a set of all environmental problems and see which ones have regimes and which do not.

4. What makes some states likely to form and join a regime and others not likely to form and join one? What factors, when present, make it more likely that a state will join a regime and, when absent, make it more likely that a state will not join?

a) Could find evidence for this by looking at a single regime and seeing whether the states that join a regime tend to have the hypothesized factor while the states that could have joined a regime but did not do not have the hypothesized factor. For example, see why states who have opportunity to join EU over time do or do not.

B. Variables that influence presence, timing, and likelihood of egime formation

1. General variables

a) Interests and preferences of states: if states don't want a regime there won't be one. Key problem is identifying preferences independently of involvement in forming regime

(1) Preferences over outcomes (well-being, security) assumed as stable in rationalist model

(2) Preferences over strategies (how to achieve well-being and security) assumed to vary depending on whether regime present and how compares to alternatives

b) Power and distribution of capabilities

c) Institutionalization of system

d) Level of uncertainty in system – Young argues that more uncertainty about outcomes increases ability to form regime but other alternative ways of thinking about uncertainty and information

e) Underlying concerns of states as either:

(1) Positional, negative altruistic, or relative gains concerns – care about what happens to others because you want to do better than them

(2) Atomistic, egoistic, or absolute gains concerns – indifferent to what happens to others

(3) Interactions in former case are zero-sum but in latter allow room for integrative bargaining and hence make regimes more likely to form

f) Interdependence – high levels of interactions provide a large set of potentially mutually beneficial agreements. What Keohane calls a dense policy space. EU is prime example. More interdependence means more policy space means more regimes.

2. Situation structure – in increasing level of difficulty of forming regime (perhaps!!)

a) Assurance (e.g., avoiding accidental war) – strong incentives to negotiate on both sides

b) Positive externalities plagued by incapacity (e.g., health care aid) – strong incentives to negotiate on both sides but incentives not to pay on one side

c) Coordination (e.g., aviation and navigation rules) – strong incentives to negotiate on both sides but made difficult by distributional problems

d) Collaboration (e.g., arms control) – fear of defection is strong and makes states reluctant to agree but all sides would benefit from a well-enforced agreement, although benefit more from one enforced against others but not self

e) Suasion (e.g., burden sharing in NATO) – fear of defection very strong and states will not agree unless offered positive side payments or seriously threatened

3. Problem structure – in increasing level of difficulty of forming regime (perhaps!!)

a) Conflicts over absolutely assessed goods (e.g., economic goods) – e..g., trade. Major conflict is "who gets more" or distributional conflict.

b) Conflicts over means (e.g., coordination of technology) – Major conflict is over how we get there.

c) Conflicts over relatively assessed goods (e.g., weaponry) – e.g., arms control. Major conflict is over avoiding defection.

d) Conflicts over values (e.g., human rights or modern whaling). Major conflict is over whether to cooperate in first place.

e) Notice how these map to but may contradict situation structure categories and hypotheses.

4. Young's hypothesized variables

a) Exogenous shocks – these increase urgency of issue

b) Equity – this allow states to overcome relative gains concerns

c) Uncertainty – this allows states to accept agreement that may not be in interest in the future, because they don't know that to be true. Notice that this conflicts with uncertainty being alleviated by intellectual leaders. Need more clarity about types of uncertainty

d) Salient solution – facilitates agreement by eliminating bargaining over all sorts of other outcomes and makes "interest-based" bargaining more difficult.

e) Compliance mechanisms available – fear of defection as major source of reluctance to negotiate agreement, so compliance mechanisms, if available, help states overcome this fear.

f) Integrative bargaining – if actors think they are gaining, more likely to agree than if distributing costs. Compare environmental agreements to trade agreements.

g) Leadership: at least two of these three are necessary for success. Leadership allows states to overcome the obstacles to regime formation. See specific hypotheses at Young, 1991, 30ff.

(1) Structural – use structural power of states to create bargaining leverage to push for agreement. More important when there is a power asymmetry.

(2) Entrepreneurial – use negotiating skills to frame issues and structure deals by focusing on integrative bargaining. Resources are social standing and negotiation skills.

(3) Intellectual – use ideas to shape how actors think about the problem. Resources are intellectual skills and knowledge. More important when there is uncertainty.

C. Variables that influence type of regime that is formed

1. Types of situation structure (distinguished by how to cooperate in first place and how to address different incentives to defect after agreement reached)

a) Assurance (e.g., avoiding accidental war) – no incentives to defect

(1) Lack of trust is major problem trying to overcome. Informational failures are crucial here.

(2) Information about what planning on doing is essential

(3) All sides seek transparency

b) Positive externalities plagued by incapacity (e.g., health care aid) – some incentives to misuse funds

(1) Attempts to avoid "obsolescing bargain"

(2) In-kind aid rather than money

c) Coordination (e.g., aviation and navigation rules) – no incentives to defect but some difficulties in negotiating because of distributional implications

(1) Formalized and very clear proscriptions and prescriptions

(2) No monitoring mechanisms necessary

(3) No enforcement mechanisms necessary

d) Collaboration (e.g., arms control)

(1) Monitoring mechanisms essential

(2) Enforcement mechanisms essential

(3) Overcoming or addressing sanctioning problem important

e) Suasion (e.g., burden sharing in NATO)

(1) Tactical issue linkage such as threats or side-payments are crucial

2. Interests of those with issue-specific power. Compare interests as stated in negotiating record and see if reflected in treaty terms. For example, ozone regime reflects "new chemicals" as answer rather than alternative, non-chemical technologies as replacements. Also, China and India's ability to get side-payments because of willingness to walk away – more satisfied with "no agreement" option than were developed states and so could extort resources in exchange for behavior change.

3. Use of side-payments or threats

D. Variables that influence whether regime is effective

1. Reduce uncertainty, increase transparency, and increase information

2. Provide linkage which facilitates reciprocity (i.e., tit-for-tat)

a) Iteration – linkage over time in single issue area

b) Across-issues – linkage across issue areas that allows tit-for-tat

3. Sanctioning problem can be overcome – incentives structured so that actors want to sanction when violation occurs. Compare trade agreements to environmental agreements.