I. Introduction

A. See lecture notes from Lecture #3 which we only touched on

B. Causes of regime formation continued from Lecture #3

II. Martin, "Interests, Power and Multilateralism"

A. What is she trying to explain? Form that international cooperation takes

1. Starts in first para by laying out variation and then sets out to explain that

2. Structure of her argument

a) DV: Form of cooperation

(1) Values of DV:

(a) Institution of multilateralism (IMs) – norm based approach in which all actors simultaneously and reciprocally provide the institutional goods – direct provision or one-step process. Consists of norms of indivisibility (e.g., collective security), nondiscrimination (e.g., MFN), and diffuse reciprocity (e.g., long-term exchange balances, not immediate tit-for-tat)

(b) Multilateral organization (MOs) – organizational approach in which actors create institution which provides the goods – indirect provision or two-step process

(2) Three stages of DV

(a) Negotiation: arriving at decision

(b) Scoping: deciding what is included in decision

(c) Implementation of decision

b) IV: What explains form of cooperation? Interaction of two major IVs

(1) Situation structure (using Hasenclever’s terms) or type of cooperation problem

(a) Collaboration

(b) Coordination

(c) Suasion

(d) Assurance

(2) Power

(a) US hegemony in Western subsystem

(b) Bipolarity at international level

c) Implications of theory – causal claims

(1) Collaboration games --> strong MOs but not based on IM principles

(a) Exchange of information is important to address threat of defection

(b) MOs can facilitate this exchange in ways that IMs can’t

(c) Diffuse reciprocity (IMs) doesn’t work here since you need specific reciprocity

(2) Coordination games --> IMs are adequate and MOs not needed

(a) Limited giving up of sovereignty because unnecessary

(b) Easier to maintain cooperation than in collaboration game with MO

(3) Suasion games --> secretive MOs used to create tactical linkage

(a) Attempt to conceal giving in to suasion – coerced state wants to save face and coercing state will get more of its way if can give coerced state a way of not seeming to do so. Both want secrecy and so find less transparency.

(b) MOs facilitate tactical linkage where one side has to make linkage that doesn’t make sense and so isn’t credible. MOs will not operate on IM principles.

(4) Assurance games --> IMs or weak MOs to facilitate info exchange

(a) Trying to clarify preferences so mistakes aren’t made because of misperception

(5) Role of power

(a) Hegemony: Multilateralism eases the burden of the hegemon – cooptation of the weak states so they "quasi-voluntarily comply" – but requires hegemon to give up some decision-making control. Getting some buy-in by sharing decision-making power eases later problem of enforcement.

(b) Bipolarity: Exit from either side of polarity becomes less credible. But also hegemons on each side of polarity have incentives to adopt multilateral rather than unilateral approaches

(c) Multipolarity leads away from multilateralism. Bipolarity fosters multilateralism, usually.

3. When do regimes decline? Factors causing change differ by type of problem – see 61ff

a) Collaboration – crises from attempts to defect

(1) Developments that decrease shadow of future (61)

(2) Changes that decrease states’ ability to remain informed about behavior of others (61)

b) Coordination

(1) If challenger thinks its on the rise it may be willing to incur short term costs in hopes of eventually getting long term gains. E.g., if France thought it was on rise and could switch to French as language of air traffic control.

(2) Public defection

c) Suasion – decline of hegemon

d) Assurance – increasing uncertainty due to domestic changes in one or more players

III. Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan "Inertia and CHange in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992"

A. Much description – boring and uninteresting until talk about "factors explaing state membership" around p. 156ff

B. Variables that "cause" states to join IOs. Look at page 157 and identify conceptual variables for which these are proxies.

1. Wealth/income as measured by GDP and GDP/capita

2. Level of "freedom" as measured by Freedom House and change in FH coding

3. Level of autonomy and stability as measured by years from independence

4. Development as measured by literacy

5. Type of government

6. Region – what is this a proxy for?

C. Discusses decline of regimes/organizations as well as their growth

1. Growth from other regimes and organizations

2. Decline from other factors such as?

a) Outlive its function

b) Non-robust – don’t adapt and change as their environment does

D. Factors that didn’t matter

1. End of Cold Ward did not cause major decline in IGOs (167)

2. Ideology doesn’t matter much in membership decisions, material things do (168)

3. But end of ideological resistance of developing states did lead them to join IGOs more frequently

E. Conclusions

1. Unsatisfactory and vague conclusions to article: "change within the IGO population … has multiple and complicated causes with roots both within the IGO population and within states" (170). Too vague to be useful – could probably have said this before doing the research.