I. Introduction

II. Hasenclever, "Power-based theories"

A. Realism basics

1. States have relative gains concerns rather than absolute gains concerns (they care about power, not wealth) and therefore find it difficult to cooperate even when doing so would seem to offer benefits

2. Problem with PD is that it assumes that actors have absolute gains concerns or, put differently, that there is not a distributional problem that needs to be solved

B. HST

1. Regimes arise as result of unipolar power distribution, i.e., hegemony. Basically, regimes are hard to create and so it takes a powerful actor with interests in resolving it to create them.

2. Stability part comes from notion that regime may have some "staying power" even after the decline of the hegemon that created it. Classic example of this staying power of institutions would be UN Security Council and its permanent members

3. Hegemon is only actor that gains sufficient benefits from regime to be willing to contribute to its creation. This is basically similar to suasion games – hegemon has dominant strategy of paying for regime but would prefer that others contribute, but will do so even if they don’t.

4. Not really collective action – the hegemon provides the public good of the rule-writing and rule-enforcement of the regime – these are not provided by collective and cooperative action. Regime formation is provided by hegemon but it does make all actors better off. Its just not provided by collective action in this view.

5. Theoretical implications

a) Increasingly equal distribution of power in world leads to decline in strength and effectiveness of regime and vice versa. Predictions for end of Cold War’s effects on regimes?

b) Strong exploited by weak – benevolent leadership model. Focus on interest of hegemon in providing, i.e., on cooperation as dominant strategy of hegemon.

c) Weak exploited by strong – coercive leadership model. Focus on power of hegemon to make others provide, i.e., on ability to coerce others to do what it wants.

6. Hypotheses

a) Structure of regime that is formed

(1) Coercive leadership – mechanisms for inducing contributions and enforcement from others in rules written into agreement. IV here is strength of hegemon - powerful

(2) Benevolent leadership – no mechanisms for coercing contributions and enforcement. More reliance on persuasion and bribes. IV here is strength of hegemon - weak

7. K-groups as variant of HST with small subset of actors cooperating among themselves

8. Interesting summary that initial HST theory may be wrong but that modified version that says something like "the more concentrated power is in the hands of a few states, the more likely it is that a regime will form" could be correct. Demonstrates value of trying to understand underlying logic rather than to simply prove theory wrong.

C. Krasner’s power-oriented research program

1. Basic claim: most of IR is about distributive bargaining not integrative bargaining – its not about moving to the Pareto frontier so much as about where you end up on the Pareto frontier

2. What is a Pareto Frontier?

 

3. Argument parallels relative vs. absolute gains concerns – Krasner argues that states care about distribution more than well-being. So, its about where you end up on curve rather than with doing better than before.

4. Important empirical question – what fraction of problems are really coordination games (a la Krasner) and which are collaboration problems?

D. Grieco

1. States are negative altruists – what happens to others as a result of cooperation matters, it just matters in a negative way. If others do better than me, I don’t want to cooperate with them.

2. States as defensive positionalists – interested in avoiding relative losses more than making relative gains. Risk averse rather than risk-seeking

3. Sensitivity of one state to another’s gains, i.e., their relative gains sensitivity,

a) Sensitivity varies across dyads of states

b) Sensitivity also varies over time, with states being more sensitive during times of war

4. Predictions about form of cooperation

a) If states are positionalist, then form of regime should try very hard to ensure balanced benefits all around that maintain pre-existing balances of power. Perhaps suggests that few regimes should leave benefits to be "doled out" by processes that are not neatly and carefully controlled.

b) Grieco (122-125 of Hasenclever) lays out a bunch of tasks that regimes must accomplish to promote cooperation – we should see this in the terms of the treaties on which the regimes are based.

c) Contrast with Keck’s argument – differences about what regimes need to provide and how likely they are to be able to provide it

E. Crucial question that stems from this chapter is question of whether relative gains or absolute gains are what motivate states, and how important they are to predicting the behavior of states

III. Alter’s article

A. DV: increasing autonomy of ECJ over time – why is ECJ more able, over time, to make judgments in cases that run against the interests of the controlling governments

1. Playing off short time horizons of politicians and long time horizons of judges

2. National judges began enforcing EC law, removing option of politicians disregarding EC law – institution of ECJ changes what is rhetorically legitimate response to a problem

3. Lack of consensus among states about how to respond to ECJ judgments make it hard to remove rulings after they are made. Notice asymmetry of problem – ratcheting affects where easier to promulgate legal precedent than to overrule it. Not because of institutions but because of distribution of incentives

B. Role of ECJ

1. Not judging compatibility of EC law and national law but clarifying EC law so that national courts can judge compatibility of EC law with national law – this would seem to leave power in hands of national courts, and hence national governments. But ECJ delineates what types of laws would be incompatible and urges national courts to rule against such laws, but without "naming names"

2. Individuals have right to challenge EC law in national courts but turns out can also challenge national law relative to EC law in national courts – notice double allegiances of judges – to national leaders on the one hand but also to lawyers and judges on the other. Latter may be more powerful.

3. Two doctrines

a) Direct effect – individuals can appeal to EC law in national courts

b) Supremacy of EC law over national law

C. Principal-agent theory as model for understanding behavior of ECJ

1. Agent’s goals/objectives differ from those of principal and agent follows their own goals rather than those of principal

a) Standard example is real estate agent who wants the sales commission more than the best price for the seller or buyer of house.

b) Same with ECJ – goal is to increase and protect ECJ’s power rather than power of member states

2. Process of change

a) Slow and incremental process of making decisions and setting precedents which in the current case did not conflict with politicians’ interests but made it easier to override their interests in the future

b) National courts look to doctrines and precedents of ECJ for their guidance not to national politicians

c) Weiler: "the legal arena imposes different rules of discourse" – what is legitimate to say in a courtroom differs from what is legitimate to say in a diplomatic conference. Might and interests are replaced with principles and precedents and logic.

d) German "national courts … refused to be told by the government that they could not apply a legally valid ECJ decision" (Alter, 186). Response of German government is to turn to lawyers but they have to play within rules of legal game and that is where they were not likely to win

e) Politicians can’t overrule legal decisions accept by higher order political ones and those were difficult and costly to do

f) Institutions determine what are valid and what invalid actions to take

3. ECJ decisions have different effects on different actors so there is rarely a coalition of support to override at the political level, even though if there were not a decision all states would be fine with having each state do whatever it liked. Courts look for universal principles that apply equally to all similarly situated actors. Politicians look for differentiated policies that provide more benefits to certain actors than to others.

a) Joint decision trap: p. 189 defined

b) Default of nonagreement is individual action prior to ECJ

c) Default of nonagreement is common policy after ECJ – major difference from before. Weak states as well as Germany prefer this outcome consistently because they are likely to be favored by such rules

D. Institutional process by which power of institution grows over time through dynamics that are not directly controlled by politicians and whose effects may be unexpected and even undesired.