I. Introduction

II. Elements of compliance systems

A. Primary rule systems: basic proscriptions and prescriptions

B. Information systems: mechanisms for identifying whether rules being followed and/or goals being achieved

C. Response systems: strategies for making compliance more likely and violation/noncompliance less likely

III. Compliance vs. effectiveness

A. Concerned about effectiveness – are things better than they would have been

B. Compliance not necessary: progress even when no compliance– frequent violations of wetland rules but still better than otherwise

C. Compliance not sufficient: progress may not be enough - compliance with Kyoto won’t stop global warming

IV. What is effectiveness?

A. Two types:

1. Counterfactual (did it help?)

2. Goal (did it succeed?)

B. Two indicators:

1. Behavior

2. Environmental quality

C. Level of difficulty varies

1. 10%/yr CFC decrease less impressive than 1%/yr CO2 increase

V. Comparing effectiveness requires comparable measure of influence

A. Different indicators (behaviors, environmental quality)

B. Different units

C. Different levels

D. Different costs

E. Different success "trajectories"

F. Estimating counterfactuals

VI. Success in a Pollution Treaty

VII. Relative effectiveness:
absolute comparison

VIII. Relative effectiveness:
indexed comparison

IX. Relative effectiveness:
first difference comparison

X. Relative effectiveness:
first difference relative to baseline

XI. Different success trajectories

A. Pollution (air, ocean, river)

B. Wildlife (CITES, species, fish)

C. Habitat (wetlands, world heritage)

D. Hurdles:

1. Complex notions of success

2. Goal not observable (harvest, not pop’n)

3. Uncertainty regarding lags until effects observable (stock recovery)

XII. Success in a Pollution Treaty

XIII. Success in a Wildlife Treaty

XIV. Estimating counterfactuals

A. Effectiveness = how regulated behavior of treaty member looks different than it would have been had it not been a member

B. Estimate "what would have happened otherwise?" from:

1. Member Regulated Behavior Before Treaty

2. Nonmember Regulated Behavior After Treaty

3. Member Non-Regulated Behavior After Treaty

XV. Strategies of international social control

A. Altering consequences

1. Deterrence (sticks): increase costs of violation

2. Reward (carrots): increase benefits of compliance

B. Altering opportunities

1. Generative (assistance): create opportunities to comply

2. Preclusive (locks): reduce opportunities to violate

C. Altering perceptions

1. Cognitive (labels): provide new information

2. Normative (sermons): re-educate regarding values

XVI. Evaluating alternative strategies

A. All strategies seek to regulate a socially undesirable behavior

1. What are model’s assumptions regarding causes of noncompliance?

2. When will they work and when won’t they?

3. Import of information to strategy success?

4. How well does strategy work?

5. How fast does strategy work?

6. What are unintended consequences?

XVII. Conclusions

A. Compliance differs from effectiveness

B. Causes of compliance differ from causes of violation

C. Comparing relative effectiveness is crucial but difficult

D. Strategies available go beyond carrots and sticks and have different effectiveness