Class overheads for Week 10
Military, press and Vietnam "lessons"
Competing "histories"
Impact on coverage of Iraq
Conventional wisdoms (Pick one)
Journalistic heroes showed true story of Vietnam debacle, the
official lies and incompetence.
Journalistic traitors showed sensationalized, gruesome version of
war and undermined public support for war, led to military defeat.
Communications effects assumption
Uncensored, shocking television images in the nation's living
turned patriotic American against the war.
Changing government policies toward press in wartime
World War II and Korea:
"Voluntary" censorship
Journalists in uniform, "part of the team"
Suppression of gore, negative information about war effort.
Limited television (Korea)
Vietnam:
No formal censorship
Few limits on travel with troops.
Daily military briefings ("Five o'clock follies")
Leaks from officials; doubts about war progress and effort.
Extensive television coverage, but edited (film). Limited "live"
coverage.
More recent historical research (nonpartisan)
Daniel Hallin, analysis of coverage. John P. Mueller, public
opinion.
Does not support conventional wisdoms
Press mostly "objective" -- repeated official statements, facts
from briefings
Limited TV showing of violence showing U.S. casualties
Effect of news coverage public opinion not as extensive as
expected in polling data (Gallup) Reinforcement, not conversion. Tone
of press coverage may have trailed U.S. public opinion, not led it.
Consequences of conventional wisdom about Vietnam in Iraq
Great White House and Pentagon concern with public opinion toward
war
Extensive Pentagon public relations campaigns to influence news
coverage in U.S. and in Iraq. Banning of pictures of coffins of U.S.
casualties.
Journalistic travel with troops largely limited to press "pools"
Official briefings, but journalists can attempt to find other
sources of information without official protection from violence.
Despite positive early press coverage, U.S. public opinion toward
war in Iraq following pattern of Korea, Vietnam: Initial patriotic
enthusiasm, support erodes as casualties increase without
satisfactory conclusion (Mueller)
Implications for journalists
Major U.S.news organizations (Washington Post, New York Times, TV
networks, rethinking unquestioning acceptance of official
rationalizations for invasion; enthusiastic coverage of military
invasion, leading to "Mission Accomplished, "2003. Possible
milestone:
NBC, LA Times officially refer to Iraq situation as a "civil
war," despite White House objections. Action compared to CBS
anchorman Walter Cronkite's 1968 broadcast in which he concluded
Vietnam war was unwinnable.
Belated skepticism of White House press corps, other mainstream
journalists, long after public opinion shifted against war, Bush
(Mueller)
Spreading independent news coverage (blogs, cable news), but no
data on how consistent or influential on general public opinion.
Expect: Continuing debate among (and about) journalists over what
should be appropriate role of journalism in wartime.
Cable, communcation satellites and the changing marketplace of ideas
on TV
Technology ends "mass" audience monopoly of three-network system,
launches new wave of specialization, niche formats.
1950s-1970s Over-the-air, licensed broadcasting
stations, slow expansion of cable from Community Antenna TV systems.
Telstar satellite, 1965.
1980 Ted Turner launches first cable superstation, WTBS,
followed by CNN, "Chicken Noodle News." Has to pay cable station
operators to allow on systems.
1991: Gulf War I, first "live" television war for the U.S.
Break-even point of profitability for CNN. Impact of "live" foreign
affairs broadcasting prompts concern over the "CNN Effect" on foreign
policy, "telescoping" of events.
Bernard Shaw
New cable news competitors: Fox, MSNBC. BBC, Aljazeera
Spread of multiple channels (500-channel universe?) by
satellite/cable erodes "mass" audience of three networks, but does it
increase diversity of content?
Reforming the mass media
Rare communications-wide study of media: news, broadcasting,
economics, role in democratic society.
Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1932-1947, "Hutchins
Commission"
Chair: Robert M. Hutchins, president, University of Chicago
Sponsor: Henry Luce, founder and publisher, "Time," "Fortune,"
"Life," etc.
Luce Concerns: (1937) Vulgarity, sensationalism, antagonistic
attitude of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, fear of government
regulation, censorship, and concentration of ownership (Hearst),
future role of press in democracy.
Commission members: Intellectuals, scholars from broad range of
fields. Journalists were not invited.
Conclusions: (1947):
Press freedom in danger: Too much sensationalism, threats from
government, economic pressures from advertisers , drive for profits,
publishers and broadcasters with political agendas.
Press no longer serving the public. Needed: More responsibility
to society.
1. Trutful, comprehensive account of the day's events in a
context which gives them meaning.
2. Forum for exchange of comment and criticism.
3. Present truly represenative picture of society
4. Help society clarify its goals.
5. Full access to information.
Remedies -- how to reform press
Rejected:
More government licensing, enforcement of anti-trust laws.
Self-regulation thought unlikely, professional groups since 1920s
unable to be effective.
Journalism schools ("apologists for the business.")
Primary recommendation:
Create independent (non-government) agencies to review press
performance
"Press Councils"
Negative responses from industry, journalism schools and Luce
himself -- cut off money to publish report.
But news council experiments continue:
National News Council, 1972-84
Regional councils: Minnesota, Washington
Journalism reviews
Civic journalism movement (2000-)