Dr. Jane Kellett Cramer

Research

Jane’s research centers on threat inflation, examining the sources of public fear of international security threats, and why intentional threat inflation succeeds at some times and not other times. Related areas of interest are the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy, as well as the theoretical causes of war, especially the diversionary theory of war. Jane’s methods are primarily qualitative, using careful process tracing to examine case studies in order to determine sources of threat inflation and the causes or motivations for foreign policy decisions.

Research Projects

“Why did the US Invade Iraq? Not for Wilsonian Idealism, the Security of Israel, or Realist Control of Oil, but for Primacy and Profits” This most recent work argues that none of these most common explanations for U.S. involvement in Iraq are primary; that instead, a desire for uncontested U.S. power and for unshared U.S. corporate wealth accession was the central incentive of the top policy makers.

“Militarized Patriotism: Why the U.S. Marketplace of Ideas Failed before the Iraq War,” (Security Studies 2007). This study carefully puts together an elegant proof of why threat inflation succeeded in the Iraq case and demonstrates that the Democratic Party-controlled Senate had enough information to know that there was no imminent threat from Iraq, and supported military involvement for domestic political reasons.

National Security Panics: Overestimation, Misperception and Threat Inflation as Sources of Public Fear.  The culmination of Jane’s Doctoral work, this manuscript examines four cases of national security panics, periods of widespread public fear that led to major U.S. foreign policy shifts (increases in the defense budget and changes in grand strategy).  These cases, the Red Juggernaut Panic (1950), the Missile Gap Panic (1960), The Window of Vulnerability Panic (1980), and the Iraq WMD Panic (2003) all are found to be orchestrated panics; intentional threat inflation by political players.  Most of Jane’s post-doctoral projects have focused on analyzing the Iraq case in order to fit it into this book.

“Why did the U.S. Invade Iraq? A Survey of Expert Opinions.”  (Revise and resubmit at Foreign Policy Analysis).   This work was done to try and decipher the reasons for invading Iraq, with the aim of uncovering the sources of threat inflation in this case.  Two most interesting findings: there is widespread belief among scholars for both the Israel Lobby thesis and the Oil thesis; there is very widespread disagreement and confusion among scholars about the causes of this war.

American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11.  Edited by A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer. (Routledge 2009) This volume addresses the broader debate about threat inflation in the United States since 9/11, offering competing explanations of threat inflation from top scholars:  forward by Stephen Van Evera (MIT), and chapters by Robert Jervis (Columbia), Jack Snyder (Columbia), David Rousseau (SUNY Albany) and Rocio Garcia-Retamero (University of Granada), Daniel Kahneman (Princeton, Nobel Laureate) and Jonathan Renshon (Harvard PhD candidate),  Ronald Krebs (Minnesota) and Jennifer Lobasz (Minnesota PhD candidate),  Jon Western (Mt. Holyoke), John Mueller (Ohio State), and Benjamin Friedman (MIT PhD candidate).  The volume contains an introductory chapter by Cramer and Thrall, and two more sole-authored chapters, one by Cramer and one by Thrall.

A Typological Theory of Diversionary War.  An ongoing research project aiming at a second book addresses the diversionary theory of war, a theory that is also known as the “scapegoat hypothesis.” This theory argues that when political leaders face political challenges at home they tend to use force abroad to shore up their domestic political support.    

“Just Cause" or Just Politics? U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War.  (Armed Forces & Society January 2006).  This case study of the Panama invasion makes the argument for that U.S. intervention being a diversionary war. It employs qualitative tests for diversionary war devised by Ryan C. Hendrickson, and revises these tests in an effort at theory development.